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Abstract
Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mech-
anism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of
designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for general submodular functions: we give a random-
ized mechanism with approximation ratio 7.91 (improving the previous best-known result 112), and
a deterministic mechanism with approximation ratio 8.34. Further we study the knapsack problem,
which is special submodular function, give a 2+
√
2 approximation deterministic mechanism (improv-
ing the previous best-known result 6), and a 3 approximation randomized mechanism. We provide a
similar result for an extended knapsack problem with heterogeneous items, where items are divided
into groups and one can pick at most one item from each group.
Finally we show a lower bound of approximation ratio of 1 +
√
2 for deterministic mechanisms
and 2 for randomized mechanisms for knapsack, as well as the general submodular functions. Our
lower bounds are unconditional, which do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that a mechanism may have to pay a large amount to enforce incentive compatibility
(i.e., truthfulness). For example, the seminal VCG mechanism may have unbounded payment (compared
to the shortest path) in path auctions [1]. The negative effect of truthfulness on payments leads to a
broad study of frugal mechanism design, i.e., how should one minimize his payment to get a desired
output with incentive agents? While a class of results have been established [1, 22, 10, 11, 4], in practice,
one cannot expect a negative overhead for a few perspectives, e.g., budget or resource limit.
Recently, Singer [20] consider mechanism design problems from a converse angle and initiate the
study of truthful mechanism design with a sharp budget constraint: the total payment of a mechanism
is upper bounded by a given value B. Formally, in a marketplace each agent/item has a privately known
incurred cost ci. For any given subset S of agents, there is a publicly known valuation v(S), meaning
the social welfare derived from S. A mechanism selects a subset S of agents and decides a payment pi
to each i ∈ S. Agents bid strategically on their costs and would like to maximize their utility pi − ci.
The objective is to design truthful budget feasible mechanisms with outputs approximately close to
socially optimal solution. In other words, it studies the “price of being truthful” in a budget constraint
framework1.
Although budget is a realistic condition that appears almost everywhere in daily life, it has not
received much attention until very recently [7, 2, 3, 20]. In the framework of worst case analysis, most
results are negative [7]. The introduction of budget adds another dimension to mechanism design; it
further limits the searching space, especially given the (already) strong restriction of truthfulness. De-
signing budget feasible mechanisms even requires us to bound the threshold payment of each individual,
which, not surprisingly, is tricky to analyze.
While the problem in general does not admit any budget feasible mechanism2, Singer [20] studied
an important class of valuation functions, i.e., monotone submodular functions. He gives a randomized
truthful mechanism with constant approximation ratio 112 for any monotone submodular functions,
and deterministic mechanisms for special cases including knapsack (ratio 6) and coverage. Further, he
shows that no deterministic truthful mechanism can obtain an approximation ratio better than 2 even
for knapsack.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we improve upper and lower bounds of budget feasible mechanisms for general submodular
functions and knapsack, summarized in the following table.
In truthful mechanism design, if there is no restriction on total payment, it is sufficient to focus on
designing monotone allocations — the payment to each individual winner is the unique threshold to
maintain the winning status [15]. With a sharp budget constraint, in addition to monotone allocation, we
also have to upper bound the sum of threshold payments. For submodular functions, the natural greedy
algorithm is a good candidate for designing budget feasible mechanisms due to its nice monotonicity and
small approximation ratio. However, the threshold payment to each winner can be very complicated
1Note that if we do not consider truthful mechanism design, the problem is purely an optimization question with
an extra capacity (i.e., budget) constraint, which has been well-studied in, e.g., [16, 21, 13, 8, 14], in the framework of
submodularity. It is well-known that a simple greedy algorithm gives the best possible approximation ratio 1 − 1/e [16].
When agents are weighted (corresponding to costs in our setting), the simple greedy algorithm may have unbounded
approximation ratio [9]; a variant of the greedy by picking the maximum of the original greedy and the agent with the
largest value provides the same approximation ratio 1− 1/e [13].
2For example, one with budget B = 1 would like to purchase a path from s to t in a network {(s, v), (v, t)} where each
edge has incurred cost 0. In any truthful mechanism that guarantees to buy the path (i.e., outputs the socially optimum
solution), one has to pay each edge the threshold value B, leading to a total payment 2B which exceeds the given budget.
1
Submodular functions Knapsack
deterministic randomized deterministic randomized
upper lower upper lower upper lower upper lower
Singer [20] − 2 112 − 6 2 − −
Our results 8.34∗ 1 +
√
2 7.91 2 2 +
√
2 1 +
√
2 3 2
*It may require exponential running time for general submodular functions.
because an agent can bid differently to get other ranking positions in the greedy algorithm, which
results in different ways of computing the marginal contributions for the rest agents, and therefore,
unpredictably change the set of winners. Singer [20] bound the threshold of each winner by considering
all possible ranking positions for his bids and taking the maximum of the thresholds of all these positions.
In Section 3, we give a clean and tight analysis for the upper bound on threshold payment by applying
the combinatorial structure of submodular functions (Lemma 3.2). These upper bounds on payments
suggest appropriate parameters in our randomized mechanism, which roughly speaking, selects the
greedy algorithm or the agent with the largest value at a certain probability.
A difficulty of deriving deterministic mechanisms is related to the agent i∗ with the largest value
v(i∗) — due to its (possibly large) cost greedy may not include it, which could result in a solution with
an arbitrarily bad ratio. However, we cannot simply compare greedy with v(i∗) because this breaks
monotonicity as i∗ is able to manage the greedy solution by his bid (this is exactly where randomization
helps). To get around of this issue, we drop i∗ out of the market and compare v(i∗) with remaining
agents in an appropriate way — now i∗ is completely independent of the rest of the market and cannot
affect its output — this gives our deterministic mechanisms for submodular functions and knapsack
with small approximation ratios (note that we still need to be careful about the agents in the remaining
market as they are still able to manage their bids to beat v(i∗)).
On the other hand, it is interesting to explore limitations of budget feasible mechanisms. Singer gives
a simple lower bound of 2 on the approximation ratio and proposes that exploring the lower bounds
that are dictated by budget feasibility is “perhaps the most interesting question” [20]. In Section 4,
we prove a stronger lower bound 1 +
√
2 for deterministic mechanisms. In most lower bounds proofs
for truthful mechanisms, a number of related instances are constructed and one shows that a truthful
mechanism cannot do well for all of them [5, 12, 17, 19]. (For example, in Singer’s proof, three instances
are constructed.) Our lower bound proof uses a slightly different approach: We first establish a property
of a truthful mechanism for all instances provided that the mechanism has a good approximation ratio
(Lemma 4.1), then we conclude that this property is inconsistent with the budget feasibility condition for
a carefully constructed instance. Furthermore, we show a lower bound of 2 for universally randomized
budget feasible mechanisms. Both our lower bounds are independent of computational assumptions and
hold for instances with small number of agents.
While submodular functions admit a good approximation budget feasible mechanism, its general-
ization seems to be a very difficult task and there may not be any good approximation mechanisms
for instances like path and spanning tree [20]. In Section 5, we take a first step of this generalization
by considering an extended knapsack problem with heterogeneous items, where items are of different
types and we are only allowed to pick one item from each type. Here we cannot apply the same greedy
mechanism for the original knapsack as it may not even generate a feasible solution; and its approx-
imation ratio can be arbitrarily bad if we only take the first agent from each type. To construct a
truthful mechanism with good approximation, we employ a greedy strategy with deletions — in the
process of the greedy, we either add a new item whose type has not been considered yet or replace an
existing item with the new one of same type. Although there are deletions, the greedy algorithm is
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still monotone (but its proof is much more involved), based on which we have similar approximation
mechanisms for heterogeneous knapsack. We believe that the greedy strategy with deletions can be
extended to a number of interesting non-submodular settings to derive budget feasible mechanisms.
2 Preliminaries
In a marketplace there are n agents (or items), denoted by A = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i has a privately
known incurred cost ci (or denoted by c(i)). For any given subset S ⊆ A of agents, there is a publicly
known valuation v(S), meaning the social welfare derived from S. We assume v(∅) = 0 and v(S) ≤ v(T )
for any S ⊂ T ⊆ A. We say the valuation function submodular if v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ) for
any S, T ⊆ A.
Upon receiving a bid cost bi from each agent, a mechanism decides an allocation S ⊆ A as winners
and a payment pi to each i ∈ A. We assume that the mechanism has no positive transfer (i.e., pi = 0 if
i /∈ S) and individually rational (i.e., pi ≥ bi if i ∈ S). Agents bid strategically on their costs and would
like to maximize their utilities, which is pi − ci if i is a winner and 0 otherwise. We say a mechanism
is truthful if it is of best interests for all agents to bid their true costs. For randomized mechanisms,
we consider universal truthfulness in this paper (i.e., a randomized mechanism takes a distribution over
deterministic truthful mechanisms).
Since our setting is in single parameter domain as each agent has one private cost, it is well-known [15]
that a mechanism is truthful if and only if its allocation rule is monotone (i.e., a winner keeps winning if
he unilaterally decreases his bid) and the payment to each winner is his threshold bid to win. Therefore,
we will only focus on designing monotone allocations and do not specify the payment to each winner
explicitly.
A mechanism is said to be budget feasible if
∑
i pi ≤ B, where B is a given sharp budget constraint.
Assume without loss of generality that ci ≤ B for any agent i ∈ A, since otherwise he will never win
in any (randomized) budget feasible truthful mechanism. Our objective is to design truthful budget
feasible mechanisms with outputs approximately close to the social optimum. That is, we want to
minimize the approximation ratio of a mechanism, which is defined as maxI
M(I)
opt(I) , where M(I) is the
(expected) value of mechanismM on instance I and opt(I) is the optimal value of the integer program:
max
S⊆A v(S) subjected to c(S) ≤ B.
3 Budget Feasible Mechanisms
For any given submodular function, denote the marginal contribution of an item i with respect to set S
by mS(i) = v(S ∪{i})− v(S). We assume that agents are sorted according to their increasing marginal
contributions relative to cost, recursively defined by: i+ 1 = arg maxj∈[n]
mSi (j)
cj
, where Si = {1, . . . , i}
and S0 = ∅. To simplify notations we will denote this order by [n] and write mi instead of mSi−1(i).
This sorting, in the presence of submodularity, implies that
m1
c1
≥ m2
c2
≥ · · · ≥ mn
cn
.
Notice that v(Sk) =
∑
i≤kmi for all k ∈ [n].
The following greedy scheme is the core of our mechanism (where the parameters denote the set of
agents A and available budget B/2).
3
Greedy-SM(A,B/2)
1. Let k = 1 and S = ∅
2. While k ≤ |A| and ck ≤ B2 · mk∑i∈S∪{k}mi
• S ← S ∪ {k}
• k ← k + 1
3. Return winning set S
Our mechanism for general submodular functions is as follows.
Random-Mechanism-SM
1. Let A = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A v(i)
2. with probability 25, return i
∗
3. with probability 35, return Greedy-SM(A,B/2)
In the above mechanism, if it returns i∗, the payment to i∗ is B; if it returns Greedy-SM(A,B/2),
the payment is more complicated and is given in [20]. Actually, we do not need this explicit payment
formula to prove our result.
Theorem 3.1. Random-Mechanism-SM is a budget feasible universally truthful mechanism for sub-
modular valuation function with approximation ratio 5ee−1(≈ 7.91).
3.1 Analysis of Random-Mechanism-SM
In this subsection we analyze Random-Mechanism-SM in terms of three respects: truthfulness, budget
feasibility and approximation. They together yield a proof for Theorem 3.1.
3.1.1 Universal Truthfulness
Our mechanism is a simple random combination of two mechanisms. To prove that the Random-
Mechanism-SM is universally truthful, it suffices to prove that these two mechanisms are truthful, i.e.,
the allocation rule is monotone.
The scheme where we simply return i∗ is obviously truthful. Also it is easy to see that prior step
when we throw away the agents having the cost greater than B does not affect truthfulness. The greedy
scheme Greedy-SM(A,B/2) is monotone as well, since any item out of a winning set can not increase
its bid and become a winner.
3.1.2 Budget Feasibility
While truthfulness is quite straightforward, the budget feasibility part turns out to be quite tricky.
The difficulties arise when we compute the payment to each item. Indeed, it can happen that an item
changes its bid (while still remaining in the winning set) to force the mechanism to change its output.
In other words, an item can control the output of the mechanism. Fortunately, in such a case no item
can reduce the valuation of the output too much. That enables us to write an upper bound on the bid
of each item in case of submodularity; summing up these bounds yields budget feasibility.
If the mechanism returns i∗, his payment is B and it is clearly budget feasible. It remains to prove
budget feasibility for Greedy-SM(A,B/2). A similar but weaker result has been proven in [20] using
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the characterization of payments and arguing that the total payment is not larger than B. Here we
directly show that the payment to any item i in the winning set S is bounded above by miv(S) · B; then
the total payment will be bounded by B. Before doing that, we first prove a useful lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let S ⊂ T ⊆ [n] and t0 = arg maxt∈T\S mS(t)c(t) . Then
v(T )− v(S)
c(T )− c(S) ≤
mS(t0)
c(t0)
.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the lemma does not hold, then for all t ∈ T \S, we have v(T )−v(S)c(T )−c(S) >
mS(t)
c(t) . Then add all inequalities together, we have
v(T )− v(S)
c(T )− c(S) >
∑
t∈T\SmS(t)∑
t∈T\S c(t)
=
∑
t∈T\SmS(t)
c(T )− c(S) .
This implies that v(T )− v(S) >∑t∈T\SmS(t), which contradicts the submodularity.
Let 1, . . . , k be the order of items in which we add them to the winning set. Let ∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂
. . . ⊂ Sk ⊆ [n] be the sequence of winning sets that we pick at each step by applying our mechanism.
Thus we have Sj = [j]. Now, since v is sumbodular, we can write the following chain of inequalities
(note that marginal contribution is smaller for larger sets).
mS0(1)
c1
≥ mS1(2)
c2
≥ . . . ≥ mSk−1(k)
ck
≥ 2v(Sk)
B
.
The following is our main lemma.
Lemma 3.2. There is no j ∈ S = Greedy-SM(A,B/2) such that it can bid more than mSj−1(j) Bv(Sk)
and still get into a winning set. Thus the payment to j is upper bounded by mSj−1(j)
B
v(Sk)
.
Proof. Assume that there is j ∈ [k] such that it can bid bj > mSj−1(j) Bv(Sk) and still wins. We will use
notation b instead of c to emphasize that we consider a new scenario where j has increased its bid to bj
and others remain the same.
Note that
mS0 (1)
c1
≥ mS1 (2)c2 ≥ . . . ≥
mSj−1 (j)
cj
≥ mSj−1 (j)bj . Thus Sj−1 still get into the winning set.
For bid vector b, denote by S the set we have chosen right before j is included into the winning set.
Thus we have
j = arg max
i∈[n]\S
mS(i)
bi
, (1)
mS(j)
bj
≥ 2v(S ∪ {j})
B
. (2)
We may assume that Sk ∪ S ) S ∪ {j}. Indeed, otherwise S ∪ {j} = Sk ∪ S and
mSj−1(j)
bj
≥ mS(j)
bj
≥ 2v(S ∪ {j})
B
≥ 2v(Sk)
B
≥ v(Sk)
B
.
Thus bj ≤ mSj−1 Bv(Sk) and we get a contradiction.
Let R = Sk \ S. Applying equation (1) and Lemma 3.1 to Sk ∪ S and S ∪ {j}, we know that for
some r0 ∈ R \ {j},
v(Sk ∪ S)− v(S ∪ {j})
b(Sk ∪ S)− b(S ∪ {j}) ≤
mS∪{j}(r0)
b(r0)
≤ mS(j)
bj
.
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On the other hand we know that bj > mSj−1(j)
B
v(Sk)
. Hence, mS(j)bj <
mS(j)
mSj−1 (j)
v(Sk)
B <
v(Sk)
B .
Combining these inequalities, we get
v(Sk ∪ S)− v(S ∪ {j})
b(Sk ∪ S)− b(S ∪ {j}) <
v(Sk)
B
.
We have b(Sk ∪ S)− b(S ∪ {j}) = b(R \ {j}) = c(R \ {j}) ≤ c(Sk).
Recall that
mSi−1 (i)
ci
≥ 2v(Sk)B for i ∈ [k]. Thus ci ≤ mSi−1(i) B2v(Sk) and c(Sk) =
∑k
i=1 c(i) ≤ B2 . We
get
v(Sk)− v(S ∪ {j})
B/2
≤ v(Sk)− v(S ∪ {j})
c(Sk)
≤ v(Sk ∪ S)− v(S ∪ {j})
b(Sk ∪ S)− b(S ∪ {j}) <
v(Sk)
B
.
Thus, v(Sk) < 2v(S ∪ {j}).
Recalling inequality (2) on mS(j)bj , we derive
mSj−1(j)
bj
≥ mS(j)
bj
≥ 2v(S ∪ {j})
B
>
v(Sk)
B
.
Hence, we arrive at the contradiction with bj > mSj−1(j)
B
v(Sk)
.
3.1.3 Approximation Ratio
Before analyzing the performance of our mechanism, we consider a simple greedy algorithm (without
considering bidding strategies): order items according to their marginal contributions and add as many
items as possible (i.e., it stops when we cannot add the next item as the sum of ci otherwise will be bigger
than B). Moreover we can consider the fractional variant of that, i.e., for the remaining budget we take
a portion of the item at which we have stopped. Let ` be the maximal index for which
∑
i=1,...,` ci ≤ B.
Let c′`+1 = B −
∑
i=1,...,` ci and m
′
`+1 = m`+1 ·
c′`+1
c`+1
. Hence, the fractional greedy solution is defined to
be
fgre(A) ,
∑`
i=1
mi +m
′
`+1.
It is well-known that the greedy algorithm is a 1− 1/e approximation to maximization of monotone
submodular functions with a cardinality constraint [16]. Also there was shown that the simple greedy
algorithm has unbounded approximation ratio in case of weighted items with a capacity constraint.
Nevertheless, a variant of greedy was suggested in [13] which gives the same 1 − 1/e approximation
to the weighted case. Next we present the following lemma, which is fundamental to our analysis,
establishing the same approximation ratio for the simple greedy algorithm with fractional solution.
(The proof is deferred to Appendix A.)
Lemma 3.3. Fractional greedy solution has approximation ratio 1 − 1/e for the weighted submodular
maximization problem. That is,
fgre(A) ≥ (1− 1/e) · opt(A),
where opt(A) is the value of the optimal integral solution for the given instance A.
Now we are ready to analyze the approximation ratio of Random-Mechanism-SM. Let T =
{1, . . . , k} be the subset returned by Greedy-SM(A, B2 ). For any j = k + 1, . . . , `, we have
cj
mj
≥
6
ck+1
mk+1
> B
2
∑k+1
i=1 mi
, where the last inequality follows from the fact that the greedy strategy stops at item
k + 1. Hence, cj > B · mj
2
∑k+1
i=1 mi
. Same analysis shows that c′`+1 > B ·
m′`+1
2
∑k+1
i=1 mi
. Therefore,
B ·
∑`
j=k+1mj +m
′
`+1
2
∑k+1
i=1 mi
<
∑`
j=k+1
cj + c
′
`+1 ≤ B.
Which implies that 2
∑k+1
i=1 mi >
∑`
j=k+1mj + m
′
`+1 and mk+1 + 2
∑k
i=1mi >
∑`
j=k+2mj + m
′
`+1.
Hence,
fgre(A) =
∑`
i=1
mi +m
′
`+1 =
k+1∑
i=1
mi +
∑`
j=k+2
mj +m
′
`+1 < 3
∑
i∈S
mi + 2mk+1 ≤ 3
∑
i∈S
mi + 2v(i
∗).
Together with Lemma 3.3, we can bound the optimal solution as
opt(A) ≤ e
e− 1
(
3Greedy-SM(A,B/2) + 2v(i∗)
)
. (3)
Therefore, the expected value of our randomized mechanism is 35Greedy-SM(A,B/2) +
2
5v(i
∗) ≥
e−1
5e opt.
3.2 Derandomization
In this section, we provide a deterministic truthful mechanism which is budget feasible and has constant
approximation ratio (where opt(A \ {i∗}, B) denotes the value of the optimal solution for the weighted
submodular maximization problem given instance A \ {i∗} with budget B).
Mechanism-SM
1. Let A = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A v(i)
2. If 1+4e+
√
1+24e2
2(e−1) · v(i∗) ≥ opt(A \ {i∗}, B),3 return i∗
3. Otherwise, return Greedy-SM(A,B/2)
Theorem 3.2. Mechanism-SM is a budget feasible truthful mechanism for submodular functions with
approximation ratio 6e−1+
√
1+24e2
2(e−1) (≈ 8.34).
Proof. Note that the bid of i∗ is independent to the value of opt(A\{i∗}, B). Therefore, the mechanism
is truthful (a detailed similar argument is given in the proof of Theorem B.1 in Appendix B). Budget
feasibility follows from Lemma 3.2 and the observation that Step 2 only gives additional upper bounds
on the thresholds of winners from Greedy-SM(A,B/2).
It remains to prove the approximation ratio. Let x = 1+4e+
√
1+24e2
2(e−1) (≈ 7.34). We observe that
opt(A,B)− v(i∗) ≤ opt(A \ {i∗}, B) ≤ opt(A,B).
3Our deterministic mechanism works in general not in polynomial time because of the hardness of computing an
optimal solution for submodular maximization problems. However, we may substitute it by the optimum of the fractional
problem; therefore for special problems like knapsack (discussed in the following subsection), we can get a polynomial time
deterministic mechanism. Note however that we cannot replace it by the simple greedy solution as it breaks monotonicity.
Our mechanism suggests a natural question on the power of computation in (budget feasible) mechanism design at the price
of being truthful [18, 6]. In particular, can an (exponential runtime) mechanism beat the lower bound of all polynomial
time mechanisms? We leave this as future work.
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If the condition in Step 2 holds and the mechanism outputs i∗, then
opt(A,B) ≤ opt(A \ {i∗}, B) + v(i∗) ≤ (x+ 1) · v(i∗).
Otherwise, the condition in Step 2 fails and the mechanism outputs Greedy-SM(A,B/2) in Step 3.
Recall that in formula (3), opt(A,B) ≤ ee−1
(
3Greedy-SM(A,B/2) + 2v(i∗)
)
. We have
x · v(i∗) < opt(A \ {i∗}, B) ≤ opt(A,B) ≤ e
e− 1
(
3Greedy-SM(A,B/2) + 2v(i∗)
)
.
This implies that v(i∗) ≤ 3ex(e−1)−2eGreedy-SM(A,B/2). Hence,
opt ≤ e
e− 1
(
3Greedy-SM(A,B/2) + 2v(i∗)
)
≤ e
e− 1
(
3 +
6e
x(e− 1)− 2e
)
·Greedy-SM(A,B/2).
Simple calculations show that 1 + x = 6e−1+
√
1+24e2
2(e−1) =
e
e−1
(
3 + 6ex(e−1)−2e
)
. Therefore, we have
opt ≤ (x + 1) · Greedy-SM(A,B/2) in the both cases, which concludes the proof of the claim with
approximation ratio ee−1
(
3 + 6ex(e−1)−2e
)
(≈ 8.34).
3.3 Improved Mechanisms for Knapsack
In this subsection, we consider a special model of submodular functions where the valuations of agents
are additive, i.e., v(S) =
∑
i∈S vi for S ⊆ [n]. This leads to an instance of the Knapsack problem, where
items correspond to agents and the size of the knapsack corresponds to budget B. Singer [20] give a
6-approximation deterministic mechanism. By applying approaches from the previous subsections, we
have the following results (proofs are deferred to Appendix B).
Theorem 3.3. There are 2 +
√
2 approximation deterministic and 3 approximation randomized poly-
nomial truthful budget feasible mechanisms for knapsack.
4 Lower Bounds
In this section we focus on lower bounds for the approximation ratio of truthful budget feasible mech-
anisms for knapsack. Note that the same lower bounds can be applied to the general submodular
functions as well. In [20], a lower bound of 2 is obtained by the following argument: Consider the case
with two items, both of unit value (the value of two items together is 2). If their costs are (B− , B− ),
at least one item should win, otherwise the approximation ratio is infinite. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that the first item wins, then its payment is at least B− . Now consider another profile
(, B − ), the first item should also win and get payment at least B −  by truthfulness. Then the
second item could not win because of the budget constraint and individual rationality. Therefore, the
mechanism can only archieve value 1 for that instance while the optimal solution is 2. This gives us the
lower bound of 2.
We improve the deterministic lower bound to 1+
√
2 by a more involved proof. We also adduce a lower
bound of 2 for universally randomized truthful mechanisms. All our lower bounds are unconditional,
which implies that we do not impose any complexity assumption and constraints of the running time
on the mechanism. Our lower bounds relys only on truthfulness and budget feasibility.
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4.1 Deterministic Lower Bound
Theorem 4.1. There is no truthful budget feasible mechanism that can achieve an approximation ratio
better than 1 +
√
2, even if there are only three items.
Assume otherwise that there is a budget feasible truthful mechanism that can achieve a ratio better
than 1 +
√
2. We consider the following scenario: budget B = 1, and values v1 =
√
2, v2 = v3 = 1.
Then the mechanism on a scenario has the following two properties: (i) if all items are winners in the
optimal solution, the mechanism must output at least two items; and (ii) if {1, 2} or {1, 3} is the optimal
solution, the mechanism cannot output either {2} or {3} (i.e., a single item with unit value). For any
item i, let function pi(cj , ck) be the payment offered to item i given that the bids of the other two items
are cj and ck. That is, pi(cj , ck) is the threshold bid of i to be a winner.
Lemma 4.1. For any c3 > 0.5 and any domain (a, b) ⊂ (0, 1 − c3), there is c2 ∈ (a, b) such that
p1(c2, c3) < 1− c2.
Proof. Assume otherwise that there are c3 > 0.5 and domain (a, b) ⊂ (0, 1 − c3) such that for any
c2 ∈ (a, b), p1(c2, c3) ≥ 1 − c2. Let c1 = 1 − c3 − b, then c1 + c2 + c3 < 1 = B, which implies that
the mechanism has to output at least two items. Since c1 = 1 − c3 − b < 1 − c2 ≤ p1(c2, c3), item
1 is a winner. Further, p1(c2, c3) ≥ 1 − c2 > 0.5, which together with budget feasibility imply that
item 3 cannot be a winner. Therefore, item 2 must be a winner with payment p2(c1, c3) = c2 due to
individual rationality and budget feasibility. The same analysis still holds if the true cost of item 2
becomes c′2 =
c2+b
2 , i.e., item 2 is still a winner with payment c
′
2. Thus for the sample (c1, c2, c3) the
payment p2(c1, c3) ≥ c′2 > c2, a contradiction.
Since item 2 and 3 are identical, the above lemma still holds if we switch item 2 and 3 in the claim.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Define c3 = 0.7 and (a, b) = (0.2, 0.3). Note that c3 and (a, b) satisfy the
condition of Lemma 4.1. Hence, there is c ∈ (0.2, 0.3) such that p1(c, 0.7) < 1 − c. Define p1(c, 0.7) =
1 − c − x, where x > 0. Symmetrically, define c2 = 0.7 and (a′, b′) = (c,min{0.3, c + x}). Again by
Lemma 4.1, there is d ∈ (a′, b′) such that p1(0.7, d) < 1− d. Define p1(0.7, d) = 1− d− y, where y > 0.
Pick c1 = 1− d− , where  > 0 is sufficiently small so that c1 ∈ (1− c− x, 1− c) ∩ (1− d− y, 1− d).
Note that since d ∈ (c, c+ x), c1 is well-defined.
Consider a true cost vector (c1, c, 0.7). Since p1(c, 0.7) = 1− c− x < c1, item 1 cannot be a winner.
Since c1 + c = 1− d− + c < 1, the optimal solution has value at least v1 + v2 = 1 +
√
2; therefore the
mechanism has to output both item 2 and 3. Hence, p3(c1, c) ≥ c3 = 0.7.
Similarly, consider true cost vector (c1, 0.7, d); we have p2(c1, d) ≥ c2 = 0.7. Finally, consider cost
vector (c1, c, d). By the above two inequalities, both items 2 and 3 are the winners; this contradicts the
budget feasibility. 
4.2 Randomized Lower Bound
Theorem 4.2. There is no randomized (universally) truthful budget feasible mechanism that can achieve
an approximation ratio better than 2, even in case of two items.
Proof. We use Yao’s min-max principle, which is a typical tool used to prove lower bounds. By the
principle, we need to design a distribution of instances and argue that any deterministic budget feasible
mechanism cannot get an expected approximation ratio which is better than 2.
All the instances contain two items both with value 1. Their costs (c1, c2) are drawn from the
following distribution (see Fig. 1 in Appendix):
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1. (kBn ,
(n−k)B
n ) with probability
1−
n−1 , where k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
2. ( iBn ,
jB
n ) with probability
2
(n−1)(n−2) , where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and i+ j > n,
where 1 >  > 0 and n is a larger integer.
We first claim that for any deterministic truthful budget feasible mechanism with finite expected
approximation ratio, there is at most one instance, for which both items win in the mechanism. Assume
for contradiction that there are at least two such instances. Note that for the second distribution
( iBn ,
jB
n ), where i + j > n, it cannot be the case that both items win due to the budget constraint.
Hence, the two instances must be of the first type; denote them as (k1Bn ,
(n−k1)B
n ) and (
k2B
n ,
(n−k2)B
n ),
where k1 > k2. Consider then the instance (
k1B
n ,
(n−k2)B
n ) . Since k1 +n−k2 > n, this is the instance of
the second type in our distribution. Therefore it has nonzero probability (see fig. 1). The mechanism has
finite approximation ratio, thus it should have finite approximation ratio on the instance (k1Bn ,
(n−k2)B
n )
as well. As a result, it cannot be the case that both items loss. We assume that item 1 wins (the
proof for the other case is similar); the payment to him is at least k1Bn due to individual rationality.
Then consider the original instance (k2Bn ,
(n−k2)B
n ); item 1 should also win and get a threshold payment,
which is equal to or greater than k1Bn . Therefore the payment to second item because of the budget
constraint is at most B − k1Bn = (n−k1)Bn . Since (n−k1)Bn < (n−k2)Bn , we arrive at a contradiction with
either individual rationality or assumption that both items won in the instance (k2Bn ,
(n−k2)B
n ).
On the other hand, for all instances (kBn ,
(n−k)B
n ), both items win in the optimal solution with value
2. Hence, the expected approximation ratio of any deterministic truthful budget feasible mechanism is
at least 1−n−1 ·1 + (n−2) · 1−n−1 ·2 +  ·1 = 2− − 1−n−1 . The ratio approaches to 2 when → 0 and n→∞.
This completes the proof.
5 Beyond Submodularity
A natural generalization of knapsack is to consider heterogeneous items. That is, we are given m
different types of items and each item has a (private) cost ci and a (public) value vi, as well as an
indicator ti ∈ [m] standing for the type of item i. The goal is to pick items of different types (i.e., one
cannot pick more than one item of the same type) to maximize total value given a budget constraint
B. The knapsack problem studied in the last section is therefore a special case of the heterogeneous
problem when all items are of different types. However, we cannot simply apply the mechanisms for
knapsack here because of heterogeneous items. (Notice however that the lower bounds established in
the last section still work.)
The main difference of this problem with knapsack or general submodular functions is that here not
every subset is a feasible solution. A straightforward greedy could end up with a very poor solution:
Consider a situation that every type contains one very small item (both vi and ci are very small) but
with large value cost ratio vici ; greedy will take all these small items first and therefore not be able to take
more since each type already has one item. The overall value of this greedy solution can be arbitrarily
bad compared to the optimal solution.
To construct a truthful mechanism for heterogeneous knapsack, we employ a greedy strategy with
deletions. The main idea is that at every time making a greedy move, we consider two possible changes:
(i) add a new item whose type has not been considered before, and (ii) replace an existing item with
the new one of same type. Among all the possible choices (of two types), we greedily select items with
highest value cost ratio: In the case of adding a new item, its value cost ratio is defined as usually vici .
For the replacement case where we replace i with j, its marginal value is vj − vi and marginal cost is
cj − ci, and hence its value cost ratio is defined to be vj−vicj−ci .
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As before, now we assume that all the items are ordered according to their appearances in the
greedy algorithm (note that some items never appear in the algorithm and we simply ignore them).
The following greedy strategy is similar to what we did for the knapsack problem. In Appendix C, we
prove that it is monotone (therefore truthful) and budget feasible. (Here for notation simplicity, we
assume that we already take an item with c = 0 and v = 0 for each type, thus every greedy step can be
viewed as a replacement.)
Greedy-HK
1. Let k = 1, S = ∅, and last[j] = 0 for j ∈ [m]
2. While k ≤ |A| and c(k)− c(last[tk]) ≤ B · v(k)−v(last[tk])v(k)−v(last[tk])+∑i∈S v(i)
• let S ← (S \ {last[tk]}) ∪ {k}
• let last[tk] = k
• let k ← k + 1
3. Return winning set S
By applying the above Greedy-HK, we have the following claim for heterogeneous knapsack. (De-
tails can be found in Appendix C.)
Theorem 5.1. There are 2 +
√
2 approximation deterministic and 3 approximation randomized poly-
nomial truthful budget feasible mechanisms for knapsack with heterogeneous items.
Finally, we comment that greedy is typically the first choice when we consider designing truthful
mechanisms because it usually has a nice monotone property. However, when we allow cancelations
in the greedy process, its monotonicity may fail. In the heterogeneous knapsack problem, fortunately
Greedy-HK is still monotone (although its proof is much more involved) and therefore we are able to
apply it to design truthful mechanisms with good approximation ratios. Our idea sheds light on the
possibility of exploring budget feasible mechanisms in larger domains beyond submodularity.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. Assume that all weights wi are integers. We reduce our weighted problem with monotone sub-
modular utility function u to the unweighted one as follows.
• For each item i ∈ [n] we consider new wi items of unit weight. Denote them as ij for j ∈ [wi] and
call i to be the type of the unit ij .
• We make the new valuation function ν depends only on the amounts of unit items of each type.
• Let a set S contains ai units of each type i. Independently for each type pick at random in the
set R with probability aiwi weighted item i. Define ν(S) = E(u(R)).
Therefore
ν(S) =
1
w1 · . . . · wn
∑
pi
u (S · pi)
where pi is a sampling of units one for each type (there are w1 · . . . ·wn variants for pi); S · pi is a vector
of types at which pi hits S.
Using this formula it is not hard to verify monotonicity and submodularity of ν. Indeed, e.g. to
verify submodularity one only need to check that the marginal contribution of any unit is smaller for a
large set, i.e. for S ⊂ T and ij /∈ T verify inequality ν(S ∩ {ij})− ν(S) ≥ ν(T ∩ {ij})− ν(T ), which is
pretty straightforward.
For any T ⊆ [n] if we consider a set of units S = {ik|i ∈ T, 1 ≤ k ≤ wi}, then according to the
definition ν(S) = u(T ). Hence, optimal solution to the unit weights problem is large or equal than the
optimal solution to the original problem.
To conclude the proof it is only left to show that the greedy scheme for the unit weights gives us
the same result as our fractional greedy scheme for an integer weights. Note that once we have taken a
unit of type i we will proceed to take units of type i until exhaust it completely (we brake ties in favor
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to the last type we have picked). Indeed, let ik, ik+1 /∈ S then
ν(S ∪ {ik})− ν(S) = ν(S ∪ {ik+1})− ν(S)
=
1
w1 · . . . · wn
∑
{pi|ik+1∈pi}
u (S ∪ {ik+1} · pi)− u (S · pi)
=
1
w1 · . . . · wn
∑
{pi|ik+1∈pi}
u (S ∪ {ik, ik+1} · pi)− u (S ∪ {ik} · pi)
= ν(S ∪ {ik, ik+1})− ν(S ∪ {ik})
Therefore, marginal contribution of the type i does not decrease if we include in the solution units
of type i. On the other hand, because ν is submodular, marginal contribution of any other type can
not increase. So we will take unit ik+1 right after ik.
Assume we already have picked set S and now are picking the first unit of a type i. Hence, S
comprises all units of a type set T . Then we have
ν (S ∪ {i1})− ν (S) = 1∏n
k=1wk
∑
{pi|i1∈pi}
u (S ∪ {i1} · pi)− u (S · pi) =
∏
k 6=iwk∏n
k=1wk
mT (i) =
mT (i)
wi
Thus i = argmaxi/∈T
mT (i)
wi
which coincides with the rule of our fractional greedy scheme.
In case of real weights the same approach can be applied but in more tedious way.
B Mechanisms for Knapsack
In this section, we describe our deterministic and randomized mechanisms for knapsack, yielding a proof
for Theorem 3.3.
B.1 Deterministic Mechanism
We consider the following greedy strategy studied by Singer [20].
Greedy-KS(A)
1. Order all items in A s.t. v1c1 ≥ v2c2 ≥ · · · ≥
v|A|
c|A|
2. Let k = 1 and S = ∅
3. While k ≤ |A| and ck ≤ B · vk∑
i∈S∪{k} vi
• S ← S ∪ {k}
• k ← k + 1
4. Return winning set S
It is shown that the above greedy strategy is monotone (and therefore truthful). Actually, it has the
following remarkable property: any i ∈ S cannot control the output set given that i is guaranteed to be
a winner. That is, if the winning sets are S and S′ when i bids ci and c′i, respectively, where i ∈ S ∩S′,
then S = S′. Otherwise, consider the item i0 /∈ S ∩ S′ with the smallest index; assume without loss of
generality that i0 ∈ S \ S′. Let T = {j ∈ S ∩ S′ | j < i0, j 6= i} be the winning items in S ∩ S′ \ {i}
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before i0. Then ci0 ≤ B · vi0∑
j∈S vj
≤ B · vi0∑
j∈T vj+vi+vi0
, which implies that i0 should be a winner in S
′ as
well, a contradiction.
Given the greedy strategy described above, our mechanism for knapsack is as follows (where fopt(A)
denotes the value of the optimal fractional solution; for knapsack it can be computed in polynomial
time).
Mechanism-KS
1. Let A = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A vi
2. If (1 +
√
2) · vi∗ ≥ fopt(A \ {i∗}), return i∗
3. Otherwise, return S = Greedy-KS(A)
Theorem B.1. Mechanism-KS is a 2 +
√
2 approximation budget feasible truthful mechanism for
knapsack.
Proof. The proof consists of each property stated in the claim.
• Truthfulness. We analyze monotonicity of the mechanism according to the condition of Step 2
and 3, respectively. If i∗ wins in Step 2 (note that the fractional optimal value computed in Step 2
is independent of the bid of i∗), then i∗ still wins if he decreases his bid.
If the condition in Step 2 fails and the mechanism runs Step 3, for any i ∈ S, the subset S remains
the same if i decreases his bid. Note that if i 6= i∗, when i decreases his bid, the value of the
fractional optimal solution computed in Step 2 will not decrease. Hence i is still a winner, which
implies that the mechanism is monotone.
• Individual rationality and budget feasibility. If i∗ wins in Step 2, his payment is the threshold bid
B. Otherwise, assume that all buyers in A are ordered by 1, 2, . . . , n; let S = {1, . . . , k}. Note
that it is possible that i∗ ∈ S. For any i ∈ S, let qi be the maximum value that i can bid such
that the fractional optimal value on instance A \ {i∗} is still larger than vi∗ . Note that ci ≤ qi.
The payment to any winner i ∈ S \ {i∗} is pi = min
{
vi · ck+1vk+1 , B ·
vi∑
j∈S vj
, qi
}
, and pi∗ =
min
{
vi∗ · ck+1vk+1 , B ·
vi∗∑
j∈S vj
}
if i∗ ∈ S. It can be seen that the mechanism is individually ra-
tional. Further,
∑
i∈S pi ≤
∑
i∈S B · vi∑
j∈S vj
= B, which implies that the mechanism is budget
feasible.
• Approximation. Assume that all buyers in A are ordered by 1, 2, . . . , n, and T = {1, . . . , k} is the
subset returned by Greedy-KS(A). Let ` be the maximal item for which
∑
i=1,...,` ci ≤ B. Let
c′`+1 = B −
∑
i=1,...,` ci and v
′
`+1 = v`+1 ·
c′`+1
c`+1
. Hence, the optimal fractional solution is
fopt(A) =
∑`
i=1
vi + v
′
`+1
For any j = k + 1, . . . , `, we have
cj
vj
≥ ck+1vk+1 > 1vk+1 ·B ·
vk+1∑k+1
i=1 vi
, where the last inequality follows
from the fact that the greedy strategy stops at item k+ 1. Hence, cj > B · vj∑k+1
i=1 vi
. Same analysis
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shows c′`+1 > B ·
v′`+1∑k+1
i=1 vi
. Therefore, B ·
∑`
j=k+1 vj+v
′
`+1∑k+1
i=1 vi
<
∑`
j=k+1 cj + c
′
`+1 < B, which implies
that
∑k
i=1 vi >
∑`
j=k+2 vj + v
′
`+1. Hence,
fopt(A) =
∑`
i=1
vi + v
′
`+1 < 2
∑
i∈S
vi + vi∗
A basic observation of the mechanism is that
fopt(A)− vi∗ ≤ fopt(A \ {i∗}) ≤ fopt(A)
Hence, if the condition in Step 2 holds and the mechanism outputs i∗, we have
fopt(A) ≤ fopt(A \ {i∗}) + vi∗ ≤ (2 +
√
2) · vi∗
If the condition in Step 3 fails and the mechanism outputs S in Step 4, we have
(1 +
√
2) · vi∗ < fopt(A \ {i∗}) ≤ fopt(A) < 2
∑
i∈S
vi + vi∗
which implies that vi∗ <
√
2 ·∑i∈S vi. Hence,
opt ≤ fopt(A) =
∑
i=1,...,`
vi + v
′
`+1 < 2
∑
i∈S
vi + vi∗ ≤ (2 +
√
2) ·
∑
i∈S
vi.
Therefore, the mechanism is (2 +
√
2) approximation.
B.2 Randomized Mechanism
Our randomized mechanism for knapsack is as follows.
Random-Mechanism-KS
1. Let A = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A vi
2. With probability 13, return i
∗
3. With probability 23, return Greedy-KS(A)
Theorem B.2. Random-Mechanism-KS is a 3 approximation universal truthful budget feasible mech-
anism for knapsack.
Proof. Since both mechanisms in Step 2 and 3 are budget feasible and truthful, it is left only to prove
approximation ratio.
Using the same notation and argument in the proof of Theorem B.1, assume that all buyers in A
are ordered by 1, 2, . . . , n, and T = {1, . . . , k} is the subset returned by Greedy-KS(A). Let ` be the
maximal item for which
∑
i=1,...,` ci ≤ B. Let c′`+1 = B −
∑
i=1,...,` ci and v
′
`+1 = c
′
`+1 · v`+1c`+1 . Hence, the
optimal fractional solution is
fopt(A) =
∑`
i=1
vi + v
′
`+1
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and
fopt(A) =
∑`
i=1
vi + v
′
`+1 < vi∗ + 2
∑
i∈S
vi.
The excepted value of Random-Mechanism-KS is therefore
1
3
vi∗ +
2
3
∑
i∈S
vi =
1
3
(
vi∗ + 2
∑
i∈S
vi
)
>
1
3
opt
which completes the proof.
C Knapsack with Heterogeneous Items
In this section we analyze heterogeneous knapsack problem and Greedy-HK, which leads to a proof
of Theorem 5.1.
C.1 Optimal Fractional Solution
We start our study again on fractional solutions to the optimization problem. First we have to define
what is a fractional relaxation for heterogeneous knapsack or more precisely what is a feasible fractional
solution.
Definition C.1. A feasible solution for heterogeneous knapsack is an n-tuple of real numbers (α1, . . . , αn) ∈
[0, 1]n satisfying
∑n
i=1 αici ≤ B and
∑
i∈t−j αi ≤ 1 for any j ∈ [m]. An optimal fractional solution is a
feasible solution that maximizes
∑n
i=1 αivi.
We have the following observation on optimal solution.
Lemma C.1. For a given budget B we can pick an optimal fractional solution fOPT such that
• there are at most two nonzero amounts of items of any type in fOPT .
• there is exactly one item of any type in fOPT except maybe only for one type.
Proof. Consider any optimal solution f
′
OPT . Fix the price pj spent on the particular type j in it. We
can use only two items of type j in order to provide the maximum value for the price pj . Indeed, if
one draws all items of type j in the plain with x-coordinate corresponding to the cost and y-coordinate
corresponding to the value of an item together with the point (0, 0), then the condition
∑
i∈t−j αi ≤ 1
will describe a point in the convex hull of the drawn set.
Thus we can take fOPT with at most two items of a type and derive the first part of the lemma.
One can derive the second part of the lemma by changing pj1 and pj2 in fOPT such that pj1 + pj2
remains constant. Indeed, appealing to the picture again, we consider two convex polygons P1 and P2
for the types j1 and j2. If both prices pj1 and pj2 get strictly inside the corresponding sides of those
polygons, then by stirring pj1 and pj2 in fOPT with keeping pj1 + pj2 constant we can get to a vertex of
P1 or P2 and do not decrease the total value.
The following algorithm computes an optimal fractional solution for heterogeneous knapsack. (For
convenience we add an item numbered by 0 of a new type with cost 0 and value 0; this does not affect
any optimal solution.)
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Fraction-HK
1. For each type j ∈ [m], (partially) order items of type j as follows:
• let last = 0, tg = 0 and Aj = ∅
• while v(last) < max
i∈t−j
v(i)
– let k = arg maxi∈t−j
v(i)−v(last)
|c(i)−c(last)| and add k to Aj
– define tgk =
v(k)−v(last)
|c(k)−c(last)|
– let last = k
2. Comprise all Aj into one big set A and order all items s.t. tg1 ≥ · · · ≥ tg|A|
3. Let last[j] = 0 for each j ∈ [m], αi = 0 for each i ∈ [n] and k = 1
4. While k ≤ |A| and ck +
∑k−1
i=1 αi · ci ≤ B
• let αlast[tk] ← 0
• let last[tk]← k, αk ← 1
• let k ← k + 1
5. If k ≤ |A|, then let αk = B−
∑k−1
i=1 αici
ck
and αlast[tk] = 1− αk
6. Return vector (αi)i∈[n]
Theorem C.1. Fraction-HK computes an optimal fractional solution for heterogeneous knapsack.
Proof.
• If we draw every item i ∈ t−j ∪ {0} as a point (ci, vi) in the plain (see fig. 2), then all picked items
in Aj will correspond to the part of convex hull’s vertices of the drawn set from (0, 0) to the item
with maximal value. Computed value of tg will correspond then to the tangent of the side of the
convex hull with the right end at the given item.
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• As in the proof of lemma C.1 one can find the optimal value, that we can get for a type j at the
price c, by taking the y-coordinate of the point on a side of convex hull with c at x-coordinate.
Thus for the optimal fractional solution we only need items from A = ∪jAj .
• Taking everything above into account we can reduce the heterogeneous knapsack to the basic
knapsack problem. Fix a type j and construct the instance of the reduced problem K˜j as follows.
For each item k ∈ Aj assign the cost c˜k := ck − c(last[tk]) and the value v˜k := vk − v(last[tk]).
It is easy to see that optimal solution to basic knapsack problem K˜j gives the same value as
the solution to the original heterogeneous problem restricted to the items of type j for any given
budget. Hence the optimal fractional solution to basic knapsack problem ∪jK˜j has the same value
as the optimal fractional solution to the original problem.
• Now it easy to check that our algorithm at stages 2− 5 computes the optimal fractional solution
to the reduced knapsack problem and thus finds the optimal fractional solution to our original
problem.
C.2 Greedy Strategy with Deletions
We consider the following greedy strategy mechanism.
Greedy-HK
1. Take the same ordered set A as in Step 2 of Fraction-HK
2. Let k = 1, S = ∅, and last[j] = 0 for j ∈ [m]
3. While k ≤ |A| and c(k)− c(last[tk]) ≤ B · v(k)−v(last[tk])v(k)−v(last[tk])+∑i∈S v(i)
• let S ← (S \ {last[tk]}) ∪ {k}
• let last[tk] = k
• let k ← k + 1
4. Return winning set S
Recall the notation in the algorithm Fraction-HK, tgk =
v(k)−v(last[tk])
|c(k)−c(last[tk])| , where last[tk] is the last
item of type tk in A at the moment when we are about to add k into A. Define Sk = (S \{last[tk])∪{k}.
Then the second condition in Step 3 of Greedy-HK can be rewritten as
tgk ≥ v(Sk)
B
We next analyze the mechanismGreedy-HK. Let us denote byMb the run of mechanismGreedy-HK
on bid b (with the corresponding ordered set Ab, the last item of each type lastb[tk] and marginal tangent
tgk(Mb)).
Claim C.1. Greedy-HK is monotone (and therefore truthful).
Proof. We will show that any losing item cannot bid more and become a winner. Assume otherwise
that item j loses with bid cj but wins with bid bj > cj , given that all others bid ci, i 6= j.
Note that when j changes his bid, it will only affect the convex hull of items in t−j ∪ {0}. The
following observations can be verified easily (see fig. 2):
19
1. Values v(S) of the set of winners and v(last[tk]) for each type tk, taking dynamically in the process
of the mechanism, keep increasing.
2. Value tgj decreases when j increases its bid (since point (bj , vj) is on the right hand side of point
(cj , vj)).
3. Ordered set Ab \ t−j is the same as ordered set Ac \ t−j
By considering the convex hull for t−j , one can easily see that if j was not getting at any moment in
the winning set S in Mc it also will never get in the winning set in Mb.
Let us explain why for j increasing its bid can not help to remain in the winning set if for the current
cost cj it has been dropped off.
Note that in the new ordered set Ab, there can be new items of the same type as j (e.g. lastc[j] can
be different from lastb[j]), but nevertheless tgj(Mb) ≤ tgj(Mc). Let j′ ∈ t−j be the item that substitutes
j inMc, then tgj′(Mc) ≤ tgj′(Mb) (note that j′ necessarily appears in Ab). Let k be an item at which
Mb has stopped, i.e. the first item that we have not taken in the winning set. Assume k stands in Ab
not further than j′. Consider two cases.
1. Let tk 6= tj . Then
• tgk(Mc) = tgk(Mb)
• v(Sj′(Mc)) ≥ v(Sk(Mc)), as j′ stands later than k in Ac
• v(Sk(Mc)) = v(Sk(Mb)), since in both Sk(Mb) and Sk(Mc) for tj type we have taken j as
well as for each other type we have taken the same item.
2. tk = tj . Then
• tgj′(Mc) ≤ tgj′(Mb) ≤ tgk(Mb)
• v(Sj′(Mc)) ≥ v(Sk(Mb)). The last equality holds true, because for each type the value of
the item in Sj′(Mc) is greater or equal than value of the corresponding item in Sk(Mb).
In both cases we can write
tgk(Mb) ≥ tgj′(Mb) ≥ tgj′(Mc) ≥
v(Sj′(Mc))
B
≥ v(Sk(Mb))
B
Thus we have to take k in Mb to the winning set. Hence we arrive at a contradiction. Hence we
have taken j′ to the winning set in Mb and therefore exclude j.
Unfortunately, in contrast to knapsack case this scheme does not possess the following property:
any i ∈ S cannot control the output set given that i is guaranteed to be a winner.
Claim C.2. Let S be the winning set of Greedy-HK on cost vector c. Then no item j ∈ S can be
remained a winner with bid bj satisfying
bj > (v(j)− v(lastc[tj ])) · B
V (S)
+ c(lastc[tj ])
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exist such j and bid bj . We can write
tgj(Mb) = v(j)− v(lastb[tj ])
bj − c(lastb[tj ]) ≤
v(j)− v(lastc[tj ])
bj − c(lastc[tj ]) <
v(S)
B
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Consider the ordered set Ac and let k be the last item we have taken in the winning set in Mc.
Now consider any item i ∈ [1, k] where tj 6= ti. We have v(S)B ≤ tgk(Mc) ≤ tgi(Mc) = tgi(Mb). By
the assumption that j is in the winning set in Mb and tgj(Mb) < v(S)B ≤ tgi(Mb), we get that Sj(Mb)
contains an item i′ with ti = ti′ and v(i′) ≥ v(i). Since j is in S and in Sj(Mb) we get v(Sj(Mb)) ≥ v(S).
Hence
v(S)
B
> tgj(Mb) ≥ v(Sj(Mb))
B
≥ v(S)
B
which gives a contradiction.
Claim C.3. Greedy scheme Greedy-HK is budget feasible.
Proof. Let S be a winning set for M. By Claim C.2, we have an upper bound on the payment pj to
each item j ∈ S, i.e.,
pj ≤ (v(j)− v(lastc[tj ])) · B
V (S)
+ c(lastc[tj ])
Let 0 = i0, i1, . . . , ir, ir+1 = j be the items of type tj that have appeared in the winning set. We have
tgi` ≥ v(S)B for each ` = 1, . . . , r. Hence
c(i`)− c(i`−1) ≤ (v(i`)− v(i`−1)) B
v(S)
Now if we sum up the above inequalities on c(il)− c(il−1) for all ` = 1, . . . , r and plug it in the bound
on pj , we get
pj ≤ B
v(S)
r+1∑
`=1
v(i`)− v(i`−1) = v(j) B
v(S)
Therefore,
∑
j∈S pj ≤ B, which concludes the proof.
C.3 Mechanisms
Given the greedy strategy described above, our mechanism for heterogeneous knapsack is as follows.
Mechanism-HK
1. Let A = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A vi
2. If (1 +
√
2) · vi∗ ≥ Fraction-HK(A \ {i∗}), return i∗
3. Otherwise, return S = Greedy-HK
Theorem C.2. Mechanism-HK is a 2 +
√
2 approximation budget feasible truthful mechanism for
heterogeneous knapsack.
Proof. The proof consists of each property stated in the claim.
• Truthfulness. The same proof as for knapsack also works here.
• Individual rationality and budget feasibility. If i∗ wins in Step 2, his payment is the threshold bid
B. Otherwise, payment to each item has an upper bound from the payment rule in Greedy-HK
and thus according to the claim C.3 final total payment will be below given budget B.
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• Approximation. Return back to the algorithm for optimal fractional heterogeneous knapsack.
Consider the stage where we add item k to a set Aj , let us define v˜(k) = v(k) − v(last[tk]) and
c˜(k) = c(k) − c(last[tk]) to be modified value and cost of item k. Let us consider fractional
knapsack ˜FK problem for those modified costs and values for all items in A. It turns out that
for any budget this new problem ˜FK has the same answer as initial heterogeneous knapsack HK.
Note that our greedy scheme Greedy-KS for modified costs and values and our greedy scheme
Greedy-HK for original heterogeneous knapsack also give the same answer. Thus applying the
part approximation of claim B.1 to the modified problem we obtain desired bound.
We can also have the following randomized mechanism with approximation ratio of 3 (its proof is
similar to Theorem B.2).
Random-Mechanism-HK
1. Let A = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A vi
2. With probability 13, return i
∗
3. With probability 23, return S = Greedy-HK
Theorem C.3. Random-Mechanism-HK is a 3 approximation universal truthful budget feasible
mechanism for heterogeneous knapsack.
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